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The ongoing Russian military activities on the Crimean peninsula are in viola-
tion of the general prohibition on the use of force under international law and 
none of the well-agreed upon exceptions to that prohibition would seem to apply. 
Instead, the Russian activities constitute an armed attack on Ukraine.
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Particularly from late February onwards, tension has risen strongly in Ukraine. 
After President Viktor Yanukovych’s escape from Kiev, Russia has increased her 
involvement in the uprising by, inter alia, de facto occupation of the Crimean pen-
insula, and by keeping Ukrainian military personnel in their camps through the 
threat of using armed force. In addition to activities by Russian troops, it would 
also seem that Russia controls groups of ex-military personnel of Ukrainian citi-
zenship which serve as an extended arm of Moscow. How is this to be understood 
in legal terms?
Obviously, the initial Russian presence on the Crimean peninsula was legal 
under the agreements of 1997 and 2010 regarding its naval and air bases located 
there. However, it would seem strange if those agreements allowed for her current 
use of military force in Ukraine.
It is unclear what degree of control Russia holds over her Ukrainian “militias”, 
but this is of less importance as Russia has clearly deployed her own forces onto 
the peninsula. This uninvited movement of Russian military personnel into the 
peninsula constitutes a use of armed force in violation of the United Nations (UN) 
Charter Art. 2 paragraph 4, since it cannot be seen as anything but the use of 
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armed force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state” 
or “in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
If the new Russian military presence then constitutes a violation of the general 
prohibition of the use of force, it must be assessed whether it is nevertheless covered 
by any of the well-agreed upon exceptions to that prohibition. Obviously, Russia 
lacks a UN Security Council mandate for her operations, but do any of the other 
exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force apply?
The new Russian military presence can hardly claim to have been validly in-
vited by the Ukrainian government. Admittedly, former President Yanukovych 
still claims to be president of Ukraine and he has indeed issued an invitation. But 
as a president ousted by popular demand and therefore currently not in control 
of the government, his invitation is not recognized by international law as a valid 
invitation. That the new government may have come to power in violation of the 
Ukrainian constitution does not suffice to have the ousted president authorize an 
intervention. Although it may be said that the new temporary government is not, 
as such, in control of the whole of the internationally recognized Ukrainian ter-
ritory, former president Yanukovych is even less in control of it.
The Russian ambassador to Australia, Vladimir Morozov, has on the other hand 
argued that the new Russian presence is legal due to an invitation by the new lo-
cal government on the Crimean peninsula. However, even if this entity could be 
said to be in effective control of the relevant area, international law only considers 
invitations given by the central government of a state as valid exceptions to the 
general prohibition on the use of force.
Normally, the right to self-defense under UN Charter Art. 51 covers an armed 
attack on the territory of the state responding in self-defense. To a certain extent, 
an attack on representatives of that state abroad may also constitute an attack on 
that state. Examples of potentially protectable representatives in this situation are 
Russian naval vessels, military planes or troops located abroad. However, it is not 
generally accepted that an attack on the citizens of a state living abroad, and even 
less people merely sharing language or ethnic links with that state, would consti-
tute an armed attack on the “self-defending” state. Admittedly, Russia has argued 
in earlier cases for a right to act in self-defense of its citizens abroad if they are 
attacked. This seems to be part of the rationale for the Russian military involve-
ment in Georgia in 2008. Nevertheless, such an expanded right to self-defense is 
definitively a minority view, and the international reactions to Russian activities 
in Ukraine would seem to underline this. Especially since the Russian troops are 
not merely evacuating Russian nationals back to Russia.
Here, it would rather seem as if Russia argues for a right to humanitarian in-
tervention for the benefit of ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, but who are not 
magne frostad
148
Russian citizens. Humanitarian intervention is normally understood as a unilat-
eral military intervention on the territory of another state, without the invitation 
of the territorial state or an authorization of the UN Security Council, in order to 
hinder serious humanitarian violations of the rights of persons who are not citi-
zens of the intervening state. Whether humanitarian intervention is seen as not 
covered by the prohibition of the use of force in UN Charter Art. 2(4), or rather as 
an exception to that prohibition, is a question we may put aside here. The impor-
tant question is rather: Where are the facts of systematic gross violations of human 
rights pertaining to these people? Moreover, as the legality of the use of armed 
force for such purposes is hardly recognized by any states these days, an exception 
being made for the United Kingdom which argued last year for the legality of a 
humanitarian intervention in Syria, Russia would be in violation of its obligations 
under international law if she seeks to rely on humanitarian intervention as a legal 
justification for her activities.
It would therefore seem as if the current Russian military involvement in 
Ukraine is illegal under the UN Charter, and it is submitted that the correspond-
ing regulation on the use of armed force under international customary law does 
not open up additional avenues for the use of armed force in the current situation. 
Actually, although the use of weapons seem so far to have been limited to warn-
ing shots, the de facto occupation of the Crimean peninsula can hardly be seen 
as something other than an armed attack on Ukraine under UN Charter Art. 51.
Moreover, the UN General Assembly’s Definition of Aggression resolution de-
fines a prima facie case of aggression as, inter alia, “[t]he use of armed forces of 
one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the 
receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement 
or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the 
agreement.” As most of the Russian forces currently involved seem to have been 
sent to the peninsula after the crisis broke out, their movements instead resemble 
other parts of the resolution: “The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State 
of the territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, 
resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the 
territory of another State or part thereof”, and “[t]he blockade of the ports or coasts 
of a State by the armed forces of another State”. As is well known, the International 
Court of Justice relied heavily on this declaration in the Nicaragua case when it 
considered the term “armed attack” in UN Charter Art. 51. If Ukraine finds herself 
to be under an armed attack and issues an invitation to foreign states to come to her 
support, a coalition of the willing may then legally use armed force against Russia. 
The consequences of such an escalation are naturally most troublesome. As the 
parties are now at the negotiating table, it is nevertheless prudent for Ukraine to 
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abstain from responding militarily until the negotiations fail, unless Russia takes 
control over more territory or her military makes use of their weapons.
Another relevant issue relates to the consequences which Russia’s involvement 
might have on the minorities living within Russia. The Russian endeavor might 
lead to the Crimean peninsula and other pro-Russian parts of Ukraine breaking 
away from Ukraine and being recognized as sovereign states by Russia, or even 
included in the Russian Federation. This would to some extent be comparable to 
the breakaway parts of Georgia later recognized by Russia as sovereign states. This 
would then supply ammunition to those who criticize Russia for applying double 
standards as regards its crackdown on separatist movements in her own south-
ern administrative regions. In the end, the current Russian action might make it 
harder for her, in the future, to argue convincingly against a breakup of inter alia 
her soft Caucasus underbelly.
